On October 9 OCR settled a ransomware investigation with Lehigh Valley Health Network for $800,000 and a three-year corrective action plan. LVHN is a Pennsylvania integrated network with five hospitals and a physician group, and the ransomware incident exposed the protected health information of 248,359 individuals. The dollar figure reflects LVHN's scale. The two Security Rule findings behind it do not. They apply the same way to a one-dentist office or a 10-provider primary care practice as they do to a five-hospital system.
OCR cited two Security Rule failures: no accurate and thorough risk analysis across all of LVHN's electronic PHI (45 CFR § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A)), and no procedures to regularly review records of information system activity such as audit logs and access reports (45 CFR § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D)).
The risk analysis finding is the one OCR keeps naming in ransomware cases, so by now it is familiar. The information system activity review finding is the one worth paying attention to, and it is the one small practices are most exposed on. It is a separate, standalone Security Rule obligation that asks a plain question: is anyone at the practice actually looking at who logged in, when, from where, and what they touched? Audit logs that the practice management system or EHR generates automatically but no human ever reviews are the common pattern OCR flags here. A hospital network has a security team watching those logs by default. A 10-person practice does not, unless somebody is specifically assigned to do it.
In LVHN's case the attacker was active before the ransomware deployed, which is the usual sequence. Timely review of system activity is the control meant to catch that kind of pre-encryption foothold. For a 1 to 20 person practice this one is not about the dollar figure. It is about two line items on an OCR document request. If OCR asked tomorrow for the practice's most recent written risk analysis and the log of system activity reviews over the last 12 months, could either one be produced? Both are expected whether the practice has five people or five hundred. The scope is smaller. The obligation is the same.
- Settlement amount
- $800,000
- Corrective action
- Three-year corrective action plan
- Individuals affected
- 248,359
- Resolution date
- October 9, 2026
What to check in your practice
- Confirm you have a current written risk analysis that lists every place electronic patient information lives in the practice (record system, email, billing, workstations, phones, cloud storage, backups), what could realistically go wrong at each one, and what you have in place today. Date it. OCR's standard ask is the written analysis itself, not a verbal summary.
- Confirm somebody actually reviews system activity on your practice management system, EHR, and work email on a regular schedule. Monthly is a reasonable baseline for a small practice. What to look at: who logged in and when, logins from unusual locations or IP addresses, after-hours access, repeated failed login attempts, newly created or newly privileged user accounts, and large or unusual data exports. Most practice management systems (Dentrix, Eaglesoft, Open Dental, Athena, eClinicalWorks, and similar) produce an audit log; Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace do too, under the admin or security console. Record who does the review, the date, and anything flagged for follow-up. If nobody is doing it today, that is the gap OCR is naming here.
- Confirm that if a workstation or cloud account was accessed by someone it should not have been, you would notice within a reasonable window, not months later. This is what the audit log review requirement is for.
- If a breach of unsecured PHI happens, remember that notice to affected individuals is due within 60 days of discovery, and notice to HHS is due within 60 days when the breach involves 500 or more individuals. LVHN was cited for missing both windows.